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Abstract  
This study investigates the effect of group affiliation on decisions to pay dividends in the Tehran Security 
Exchange. Therefore, the relationship between policy dividends and factors such as information asymmetry, 
dependence on external financing (sources outside the institution) is checked.The research data is collected from 
50 firms in the Tehran Security Exchange (TSE) during 2005-2013.The statistical technique is used to examine 
the assumption of multiple regressions. In order to examine the hypotheses, data is collected from the annual 
reports of the companies using official bulletins of the Tehran stock exchange, mainly, through Novin software, 
Tadbir Pardaz software, and stock sites such as www.rdis.ir. The results indicate that between the payment of 
dividends and the amount of capital and thus the dependence on external financing has a positive and significant 
relationship with information asymmetry. 
Keywords: Payment of dividends, Dependence on external financing, information asymmetry, The Tehran 
Security Exchange  
 
Introduction 
 Dividend Policy refers to a company’s policy which determines the amount of dividend payments and the 
amounts of retained earnings for reinvesting in new projects. This policy is related to dividing the firm’s earning 
between payment to shareholders and reinvestment in new opportunities.  In corporate finance, one of the most 
important decisions is concerned with the answer of this question that should the profits of firm be distributed to 
the shareholders as dividend or it must be reinvested in new opportunities and if it must be distributed, what 
proportion of profit must be paid to shareholder and what proportion must be returned to the business? 
Business groups are collections of legally independent firms, which share a 
Common identity and are linked through various channels such as cross-holdings of equity or inter-locking 
directorships. Arguably, the groups have evolved to mitigate informational asymmetry and market imperfections 
(see Manos et al., 2007). For example, where inefficient flow of information makes it very costly for firms to 
raise external capital for investment, group affiliated firms tend to pursue diversification strategies and create 
internal capital markets (see Gopalan et al., 2007).It is interesting to note that information problems and market 
imperfections also provide an important cross-cutting element of the main theories of dividend policy. As shown 
by La Porta, et al. (2000).It may well be the case that the business group monitors member firms and facilitates 
information sharing within the group, thereby reducing asymmetric information. Also, the group may be able to 
create internal capital markets, to save underwriting fees, or to secure the availability of external finance through 
reputation or its access to bureaucrats, thereby circumventing capital market imperfections. Therefore, it would 
appear that, compared to their independent counterparts, group-affiliated firms are relatively less dependent on 
formal capital markets and may be able to pay a dividend always (i.e. no dividend omissions) or to sustain high 
dividends. But equally, and perhaps contrarian, when the business group creates a virtual internal capital market, 
member firms do not need to use dividend policy to signal high profitability in order to access external finance. 
Hence, group-affiliated firms may decide to omit dividend payment; or if they do not, the payout ratio may be 
rather lower than that of independent firms. Dividend payment; or if they do not, the payout ratio may be rather 
lower than that of independent firms. 
 
Literature Review 
In general, the theoretical framework for explaining the dividend payment decision and the payout level decision 
over the last two decades has been dominated by signaling theory, agency theory, the asymmetric information 
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implications of pecking order theory of capital structure, and more recently catering theory and lifecycle theory 
(see, among others, Denis & Osobov, 2008; Von Eije &  egginson, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009). The signaling 
theory emphasizes the role of dividends in conveying private information to investors about the prospects of the 
firm  Bhattacharya, 1979; Cheng et al., 2011; Dasilas & Leventis, 2010; Miller & Rock, 1985). The higher the 
level of information asymmetry faced by a firm, the higher is the firm's payout ratio, arguably because dividend 
policy can be used to reduce information asymmetry and signal profitability and quality. However, Denis and 
Osobov (2008) question the importance of signaling theory, in view of their finding that dividends tend to be 
paid by firms with high earnings, which hardly need to signal their profitability. 
Agency theory is refined by Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) to underpin the role of dividends in 
controlling agency relationships between shareholders and managers. It is argued that paying dividend forces the 
firm to raise additional funds from the capital market, thereby exposing the firm to the discipline of the market 
and reducing the scope for agency conflicts. Jensen (1986) extends the arguments to generate the free cash flow 
hypothesis, which predicts that shareholders have preference for dividends because in the absence of profitable 
investment opportunities managers may squander retained cash, especially if the firm faces a high level of 
information asymmetry. Indeed, La Porta, et al. (2000) find evidence to suggest that dividends are the result of 
pressure by minority shareholders on corporate insiders to disgorge cash. 
Further, in the presence of information asymmetry, use of external finance sends negative signals to the market 
regarding the value of the firm, so if external finance is required, firms prefer debt, on which the returns are more 
certain, and only as a last resort is equity issued, according to the pecking order theory of the firm's capital 
structure by Myers and Majluf (1984). Hence, the pecking order theory of the firm's capital structure has at least 
two important implications for dividend policy (Deshmukh, 2005). The first is that the higher the level of 
information asymmetry a firm faces, the lower is its payout ratio, because the costs associated with using 
external finance rise with the level of information asymmetry. The second is that the higher the firm's 
dependency on external finance, the lower is its payout ratio, because holding constant the level of information 
asymmetry the firm faces, external finance is always more costly than internal finance. 
A recent contribution to the dividend literature is the lifecycle theory which argues that firms adjust their 
dividend policy through time in response to changes in investment opportunities (De Angelo & De Angelo, 
2006). In its early life, the firm tends to pay low dividends because investment opportunities are abundant while 
internally generated capital is low. Later in the firm's lifecycle, internally generated cash exceeds investment 
opportunity so higher dividends are paid to mitigate free cash flow problems. Evidence in support of the theory 
is found by DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008). However, Von Eije and Megginson (2008) 
find no correlation between retained earnings (to total equity) and the likelihood of paying dividends. 
It is curious that information asymmetry, market imperfections and related factors, which underpin the 
theoretical framework for dividend policy, also explain why business groups exist. According to the market 
failure theory of business groups, this type of industrial organization exists because it is able to overcome market 
failure, by creating internal capital markets that substitute for missing external capital markets and weak 
institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) and by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and the market, 
through group visibility (Dewenter et al., 2001). Also, business groups overcome market failure through 
Diversification across a number of industries, as highlighted in the literature on conglomerates. Although 
evidence suggests that the conglomerate creates an internal capital market through internal cross-subsidization, 
increases the access of its divisions to capital, reduces earnings volatility and supports higher levels of debt for 
member firms, it has been found also that conglomerate type  diversification destroys rather than creates value 
(see Chen et al., 2010) and, in general, conglomerates tend to trade at a discount relative to similar independent 
firms (for example, Denis et al., 2002). Further, the diversification discount is attributed to higher information 
asymmetry in diversified firms, due to complex organizational structure and opaque financial information (Lin et 
al., 2007). 
Furthermore, it may well be the case that business groups create inefficient capital markets. Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) note the potential for conflict of interests between the controlling shareholder and member firms in 
business groups; which is exacerbated when the controlling entity pursues objectives other than  shareholder 
wealth maximization and tunnels assets and profits away from member firms (Johnson et al., 2000). Indeed, 
Baek et al. (2006) find that private offerings within Korean business groups are set to benefit the controlling 
shareholders, and prices of these issues are set at a discount when the controlling entity has lower holdings 
compared with its holdings in the acquiringmembers.Moreover, Almeida andWolfenzon (2006) argue that even 
if the internal capital market of the business group is efficient, this organizational structure may still be 
detrimental to capital allocation. 
 
Research Hypotheses  
Based on the dividend Policy and theory of market failure  on business groups, the theoretical framework, The 
hypothesis that the two groups with regard to the role of business groups in decision-making dividend payments 
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((to pay or not to pay) and decide on the amount of dividends paid (how much is paid) is planned. So the 
hypotheses of this research are as follows: 
Group I: The general theory of the relation between dividend policy and factors such as information asymmetry, 
dependence on external financing (sources outside the institution): 
H1:There is a significant relationship between payment of dividends and amounts due to the dependence on 
capital and  external finance.  
H2: There is a significant relationship between payment of dividends and amounts due to the dependence on 
capital and  information asymmetry. 
Group II: hypotheses based on how well the quality of the relationships between the companies of independent 
related groups: 
H1: The likelihood of paying dividends and the payout level decrease with dependency on external finance and 
with the level of  information asymmetry. 
Group III: hypotheses based on how the relationship between volatility and other related companies consolidated 
(group) based on the size and diversity: 
H1: The likelihood of paying dividends and the payout level increase with the lifecycle of the firm. 
 
Variables Definitions  
Dependent variable 
• firm's payout ratio(PAYOUT): is defined as the firm's payout ratio for investigating the payout level 
decision (how much to pay); and as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend and zero 
otherwise, for investigating the dividend payment decision (to pay or not to pay). 
 
Independent variables 
• previous year's payout (P_PAYOUT): Calculates and evaluates the amount of dividends paid last 
year. 
• dependency on external finance (DEP): A firm is dependent on external finance when it has 
insufficient internally generated funds to meet viable investment opportunities, so DEP is calculated as 
the percentage of growth in sales that cannot be financed from free cash flow (1 - after tax cash flow per 
unit of growth in sales). 
• level of information asymmetry( P_STD): is measured as the standard deviation of the daily residual 
returns from the market model, calculated over a calendar year. Consistent with previous work, P_STD, 
a measure of uncertainty, is a good indication of the level of information asymmetry and of the direct 
and indirect costs of issuing external finance (see Blackwell, Marr, & Spivey, 1990; Lin et al., 2007). 
• AGE: is a proxy for lifecycle theory (DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 2006), measured as the natural logarithm 
of age since incorporation. 
 
METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
In this study, the multiple regressions are used for data analysis. Initial data was inserted in  Excel 
spreadsheet and SPSS software was applied to analyze the data statistically. Also Rahavard Novin software, 
Tadbir Pardaz software, stock organization library and stock sites such as www.rdis.ir & www.irbourse.com 
were used. 
Sample Selection  
The sample was chosen from the firms listed on the Tehran stock exchange (TSE), from 2006 to 2013, using 
the following criteria:  
1). Firms were listed in TSE during 2006-2013.  
2). Data was available for all the years under the study.  
3). The companies didn‘t have changed the fiscal year for the period studied.  
4). Banks, Insurance and Investment firms were not considered in this study.  
Regarding the conditions above and the limitations, 50 companies were chosen from among firms listed in 
Tehran Stock exchange.  
Research Method and Regression Model  
Considering that the aim of this study was to examine The effect of group affiliation on decisions to pay 
dividends Company of listed in Tehran Stock Exchange First of all variables in the model study in a multiple 
regression model tested general form it is as follows: 
PAYOUTi,t=α0+α1P_PAYOUTi,t+α2DEPi,t+α3P_STDi,t+α4AGEi,t +έi,t 
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These Variables are summarized in the table (1). 
 (Table 1) :Description of the variables 
Names of the Variables Proxies 
PAYOUTi,t firm's payout ratio 
P_PAYOUTi,t previous year's payout 
DEPi,t dependency on external finance 
P_STDi,t level of information asymmetry 
AGEi,t  lifecycle Company 
 
Data Analysis  
Pearson Correlation Coefficient and Multivariate Regression were used to analyze data.  
Ho= Data is normal  
H1= Data is abnormal 
Table (2): One-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
 DIV 
N 225 
Normal parameters
a.b
 Mean .8178 
Std. Deviation .38689 
Most Extreme Differences Absolute .074 
Positive .074 
Negative -.070 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.212 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .106 
a. Test distribution is normal. 
b. Calculated from data. 
Following the table (II), Sig = 0.106>0.05. Thus results show that data is normal. 
Testing Results of hypothesis: 
 Table (3):Variables Entered 
Method Durbin-Watson Adjusted R Square Variables Entered Model 
Step wise  0.584 P_PAYOUTi,t 1 
Step wise  0.674 DEPi,t 2 
Step wise 1.643 0.804 P_STDi,t 3 
Under the Tables (3) are considered, the results are statistically Enter. This test can be improved by using the 
logistic regression model and the independent variables, the regression model can be determined. The results 
indicate that the four independent variables that were studied and their impact on corporate dividends payable, 
variable life company does not have a significant effect on corporate dividends payable. As the table indicates, 
the first model is the dividend payable last year.  
And then dependency on external finance, information  asymmetry  are entered into the model. Thus, the new 
model is as follows: 
 
Table 4: Excluded Variables 
VIf 
Partial 
Correlation 
Sig t Beta ln Variable model 
1.002 -0.121 0.034 -2.128 -5.834 AGEi,t  1 
As it is seen, AGEi,t, significance level is equal to .034> 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model. 
Presenting total optimum model based on model 3 (T-test) 
Optimum model was model 3, which had a more determination coefficient than the previous ones. In fact, when 
most variables were beside each other, they could present a more precise prediction in decisions on corporate 
dividends payable therefore, the optimum model was 3. 
  
PAYOUT= β 0+ β 1PAYOUT-P+ β 2DEP+ β 3P-STD + ti,ε 3   
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.6, 2014 
 
142 
Table (5) :Coefficients of model 3 
 
VIF 
 
Sig 
 
t 
StandardizedCoefficients UnstandardizedCoefficients  
Model4 Beta Stl. Erro B 
 0.000 11.949  .059 .702 Constant 
1/031 0.000 5.746 .361 0.000 2.02 P_PAYOUTi,t 
1/003 0.000 -2.019 -.125 0.000 -2.76 DEPi,t 
1/032 0.000 .187 .012 .010 .002 P_STDi,t 
 
The optimal regression model was written as the following: 
 
According to the statistical results of the hypothesis to test the research, level of information asymmetry and 
previous year's payout are positive and have  a significant impact on the firm's payout ratio while the dependency 
on external finance impact is negative and significant. Meanwhile, based on Table (3) the results of tests, suggest 
that, Three  independent variables of the study have a significant relationship with the firm's payout ratio (F= @. 
/000), which together offer a 80% (AdjR 2 = 0.804) Explains the behavior of the dependent variable. 
 
Conclusion  
This study investigates the effect of group affiliation on decisions to pay dividends in the Tehran Security 
Exchange. Therefore, the relationship between policy dividends and factors such as information asymmetry, 
dependence on external financing (sources outside the institution) is checked. According to the statistical results 
of the hypotheses to test the research,  
The first group of hypotheses, the result first hypothesis shows that, between the payment of dividends and the 
amount of capital and thus the dependence on external financing there were  positive and significant , As well 
the result first hypothesis shows that, between the payment of dividends and the amount of capital and thus the 
dependence on information asymmetry there were  positive and significant. 
The second  group of hypotheses , the result hypothesis shows that, between the payment of dividends and the 
dividend rate paid last year there were positive significant positive relationship, Thus, as expected, compared 
with independent companies, affiliated companies have higher levels of dividend payments. 
The third  group of hypotheses , the result  hypothesis  shows that, between the payment of dividends and 
lifecycle Company there is no significant relationship. 
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